Simplicity | Calvinism Examined

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Quoting from Open Theism: Its Nature, History, and Limitations: 1

That the origination of all things in God does entail divine simplicity appears from the following considerations. 11 If God created all things, then everything other than he must be a creature. The principle of causality dictates, moreover, that no perfection of God is a creature; just as the reader cannot pay the author a trillion dollars, because he does not possess a trillion dollars, so God could not create any perfection that he did not possess antecedently in himself. If it is the case, however, that everything other than God is a creature of God; and that no perfection of God is a creature of God; then no perfection of God is other than God. If no perfection of God is other than God, then every perfection of God is identical with God. If every perfection of God, furthermore, is identical with God, then the principle of the transitivity of identity (i.e., if a=b and b=c, then a=c) dictates that every perfection of God is identical with every other perfection of God: that, in other words, God is simple. Since the doctrine of the origination of all things in God implies that God is simple, then, this doctrine at least implicitly conflicts with open theism.

Let's look at this.

That the origination of all things in God does entail divine simplicity appears from the following considerations. 11 If God created all things, then everything other than he must be a creature.

The principle of causality dictates, moreover, that no perfection of God is a creature; just as the reader cannot pay the author a trillion dollars, because he does not possess a trillion dollars, so God could not create any perfection that he did not possess antecedently in himself.

If it is the case, however, that everything other than God is a creature of God; and that no perfection of God is a creature of God; then no perfection of God is other than God.

This is where the argument goes circular. It should end with, "then no perfection of God is other than a characteristic/part/aspect of God." Saying otherwise, as it does, is assuming what is to be proved, that any perfection of God is all of God, or that God is simple.

If no perfection of God is other than God, then every perfection of God is identical with God. If every perfection of God, furthermore, is identical with God, then the principle of the transitivity of identity (i.e., if a=b and b=c, then a=c) dictates that every perfection of God is identical with every other perfection of God: that, in other words, God is simple. Since the doctrine of the origination of all things in God implies that God is simple, then, this doctrine at least implicitly conflicts with open theism.

The argument hinges on this statement:

If no perfection of God is other than God, then every perfection of God is identical with God.

Thinking about this, I compared the statement with the one below:

If no part of Michelangelo is other than Michelangelo, then every part of Michelangelo is identical with Michelangelo.

We may therefore rightly conclude that the nose of Michelangelo is identical with the left foot of Michelangelo, which is also identical with the right ear of Michelangelo. All parts of Michelangelo are identical with the nose of Michelangelo, and therefore Michelangelo consists of one big nose!

Am I missing something?

The words other than seem key - other than in the above argument is assumed to mean not identical with, while those same words can actually mean not a part of.

The logical equivocation of these two meanings seems to lead to the error.

The argument denies the interpretation of the words "no perfection of God is other than God" as "no perfection of God is other than a part or aspect of God" and there is no justification for this, other than assuming what is to be proven. But assuming the result of a proof in order to prove that result is invalid (aka circular reasoning).

Put another way, the argument assumes the interpretation of the words "no perfection of God is other than God" as "no perfection of God is other than identical with God" and is then used to conclude the "then" clause: "then every perfection of God is identical with God."